We investigate the combination between causal/ zero-delay source coding and information-theoretic secrecy. Two source coding models with secrecy constraints are considered. We start by considering zero-delay perfectly secret lossless transmission of a memoryless source. We derive bounds on the key rate and coding rate needed for perfect zero-delay secrecy. In this setting, we consider two models that differ by the ability of the eavesdropper to parse the bit-stream passing from the encoder to the legitimate decoder into separate messages. We also consider causal source coding with a fidelity criterion and side information at the decoder and the eavesdropper. Unlike the zero-delay setting where variable-length coding is traditionally used but might leak information on the source through the length of the codewords, in this setting, since delay is allowed, block coding is possible. We show that in this setting, a separation of encryption and causal source coding is optimal.
I. INTRODUCTION
W E CONSIDER several source coding problems with secrecy constraints, in which an encoder, referred to as Alice, transmits the output of a memoryless source to a decoder, referred to as Bob. The communication between Alice and Bob is intercepted by an eavesdropper, referred to as Eve. A secret key is shared between Alice and Bob with which they can respectively encrypt and decrypt the transmission. Attention is restricted to zero-delay and causal settings. Our setting represents time-critical applications, like live multimedia streaming, which needs to be transmitted or stored securely so that the contents can be revealed only to authorized parties. Although there is vast literature dealing with source coding with secrecy constraints, as well as works that deal with source coding with delay or causality constraints, very little attention was given in the information theory literature to the combination of these problem areas.
This paper has two main sections. We start with zero-delay source coding and include secrecy constraints. Our goal is to characterize the pairs of coding rate and key rate (to be formally defined later) with which perfectly secure, zero-delay, lossless transmission is possible. Two models of eavesdroppers are considered, which differ in their ability to parse the bit-stream which is transmitted from Alice to Bob. We continue with the causal source coding setting, as defined by Neuhoff and Gilbert [1] , in which delay is allowed, but the cascade of encoder and decoder must be a causal function of the source. In this setting, our goal is to characterize the achievable region of the quadruple composed of rate, distortion, key rate and uncertainty at the eavesdropper (equivocation, formally defined later). This setting is later extended to the scenario where side information (SI), correlated to the source, is available to Bob and Eve. We introduce each of these settings in more depth and discuss the fundamental difference between them when secrecy is involved in the sequel after reviewing relevant past work.
Shannon [2] introduced the information-theoretic notion of secrecy, where secrecy is measured through the remaining uncertainty about the message at the eavesdropper. This information-theoretic approach of secrecy allows to consider secrecy issues at the physical layer, and ensures unconditionally (regardless of the eavesdroppers computing power and time) secure schemes, since it only relies on the statistical properties of the system. Wyner introduced the wiretap channel in [3] and showed that it is possible to send information at a positive rate with perfect secrecy as long as Eve's channel is a degraded version of the channel to Bob. When the channels are clean, two approaches can be found in the literature of secure communication. The first assumes that both Alice and Bob agree on a secret key prior to the transmission of the source. The second approach assumes that Bob and Eve (and possibly Alice) have different versions of SI and secrecy is achieved through this difference.
For the case of shared secret key, Shannon showed that in order for the transmission of a DMS to be fully secure, the rate of the key must be at least as large as the entropy of the source. Yamamoto ([4] and references therein) studied various secure source coding scenarios that include an extension of Shannon's result to combine secrecy with ratedistortion theory. In both [2] , [4] , when no SI is available, it was shown that separation is optimal. Namely, using a source code followed by encryption with the shared key is optimal. The other approach was treated more recently by Prabhakaran and Ramchandran [5] who considered lossless source coding with SI at both Bob and Eve when there is no rate constraint between Alice and Bob. It was shown that the Slepian-Wolf [6] scheme is not necessarily optimal when the SI structure is not degraded. Coded SI at Bob and SI at Alice was considered in [7] . These works were extended by Villard and Piantanida [8] to the case where distortion is allowed and coded SI is available to Bob. Merhav combined the two approaches with the wire-tap channel [9] . In [10] , Schieler and Cuff considered the tradeoff between rate, 0018-9448 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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key rate and distortions at the eavesdropper and legitimate decoder when the eavesdropper has causal access to the source and/or correlated data. Note that we mentioned only a small sample of the vast literature on this subject. In the works mentioned above, there were no constraints on the delay and/or causality of the system. As a result, the coding theorems of the above works introduced arbitrary long delay and exponential complexity. The practical need for fast and efficient encryption algorithms for military and commercial applications along with theoretical advances of the cryptology community, led to the development of efficient encryption algorithms and standards which rely on relatively short keys. However, the security of these algorithms depend on computational complexity and the intractability assumption of some hard problems. From the information-theoretic perspective, very little work has been done on the intersection of zero-delay or causal source coding and secrecy. A notable exception is [11] which considered the combination of prefix coding and secrecy. 1 The figure of merit in [11] is the expected key consumption where it is assumed that Alice and Bob can agree on new key bits and use them during the transmission. However, no concrete scheme was given on how these bits will be generated securely.
For causal source coding, it was shown in [1] , that for a discrete memoryless source (DMS), the optimal causal encoder consists of time-sharing between no more than two memoryless quantizers, followed by entropy coding. In [13] , Weissman and Merhav extended [1] to include SI at the decoder, encoder or both. The discussion in [13] was restricted, however, only to settings where the encoder and decoder could agree on the reconstruction symbol. In [14] this restriction was dropped. Zero-delay source coding with SI for both single user and multi-user was also considered in [14] .
Without secrecy constraints, zero-delay lossless source coding is achieved by sending a bit-stream compsed by the Huffman codewords for the source. When secrecy is involved, such bit-stream should be encrypted. As will be shown in the sequel, the ability of the eavesdropper to parse this bit-stream into the separate encrypted messages will affect the ability of the encoder to compress the source symbols. While at first glance it seems that there is no reason that the eavesdropper would be able to parse an encrypted bitstream without the use of the key, practical aspects of the system might enable it to extract the parsing data. For example, assume the communication between the encoder and legitimate decoder is carried over a packet network. In a real-time setting, each encrypted source symbol might be sent in a separate packet. An eavesdropper with access to the network might use a packet sniffer to intercept, not only the encrypted bitstream but also the size of each of the packets composing it, thus obtaining the ability to parse the bit-stream into the separate encrypted messages. In such a scenario the encoder must make sure that no information is leaked by the length of the packet. 2 We note that such an assumption on the 1 Reference [11] was presented in parallel to the ISIT 2012 presentation of this paper [12] . 2 For example, if a Huffman codeword is encrypted, its length still reveals information since short messages correspond to high probability symbols. eavesdropper ability goes beyond the usual assumptions that the eavesdropper shares the knowledge of the system model, source statistics etc., with Alice and Bob since it actively gives the eavesdropper knowledge which might depend on the realization of the source. However, such a model is strongly motivated since virtually any contemporary mobile device can serve as a packet sniffer and therefore any security aware user must successfully cope with such eavesdroppers. Our first contribution is a theorem that states that for the class of encoders we evaluate, the minimum key rate is lower bounded by the average Huffman codeword length of the source. Moreover, no compression is possible under such a strong eavesdropper. A simple scheme that achieves the lower bound is given.
We also evaluate the complementary model in which the eavesdropper cannot parse the bit-stream. This can be the case, for example, when the eavesdropper gains access to the storage device on which the stream was stored, but not to the realtime communication (or network log) between the encoder and decoder. Even in such a case, the total bit-stream length, which can still leak information on the source sequence, 3 is known to the eavesdropper. Our second contribution is the analysis of this model under less stringent secrecy constraints, where we require that secrecy is maintained with probability going to one as the length of the source sequence grows. Under this model we show that both the key and compression rate can be as low as the average Huffman codeword length of the source.
In the last part of this work, we revisit the causal setting of [1] and include secrecy constraints. The causality constraint, as defined in [1] , does not impose a delay constraint and therefore, compared to the two real-time models considered above, the causal model is less restricted. Accordingly, for this model, our results are more general and include lossy transmission of the source as well as imperfect secrecy. From [1] and [14] , it is evident that a result for zero-delay coding is easily convertible to a result for the causal setup and vice-versa. However, as will be seen in this paper, when secrecy is involved this correspondence between zero-delay and causal coding does not hold anymore.
The introduction of arbitrary delay in the scheme of [1] renders it impractical. However, their result lower bounds the optimal zero-delay coding performance and gives us insight on how the functional causality restriction affects the rate compared to classical rate-distortion results (which employ non-causal quantization). Following this, we explore how the causality restriction affects the region derived by Yamamoto [4] . The results we obtain serve as an inner bound to the rate-distortion-equivocation-key rate region of any scheme which works in real-time. To achieve secrecy, one can separate the encryption and source coding. Namely, encrypt the output of the entropy coder in the cascade of [1] with the key and decrypt before the entropy decoder at the receiver side. The last contribution of this paper is a proof that the cascade of [1] is still optimal and the described separation scheme is optimal with the secrecy constraints. When SI is available, as shown in [14] , the cascade of quatizer and entropy coding is no longer optimal. We show, however, that in this case as well, separation between source coding and encryption is optimal. While the direct part of the proof is trivial, since we use separation, the proof of the converse turns out to be quite involved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we deal with the zero-delay setting. Section III deals with the causal setting where delay is allowed. Each section starts with a formal definition of the setting. We conclude this work and point to several possible future directions in Section IV.
II. ZERO-DELAY PERFECT SECRECY
In this section, we consider the combination of zero-delay source coding and secrecy. The difference between zero-delay and causal source coding boils down to the replacement of the entropy coding in the scheme of Neuhoff and Gilbert [1] with instantaneous coding. However, as the example given in the Introduction indicates, replacing the entropy coding with instantaneous coding will result in information leakage to Eve, at least when Eve can parse the bit-stream and knows the length of each codeword. In the setup we consider in this section, neither Bob nor Eve have access to SI. The extension to the case where both Bob and Eve have the same SI is straightforward and will be discussed in the sequel. We start with notation and formal setting in Section II-A. Section II-B will deal with the setting where Eve has parsing information while Section II-C will deal with the setting where Eve cannot parse the bit-stream.
A. Preliminaries
We begin with notation conventions. Capital letters represent scalar random variables (RV's), specific realizations of them are denoted by the corresponding lower case letters and their alphabets -by calligraphic letters. For i < j (i , jpositive integers), x j i will denote the vector (x i , . . . , x j ), where for i = 1 the subscript will be omitted. We denote the expectation of a random variable X by E(X) and its entropy by H (X). For two random variables X, Y , with finite alphabets X , Y, respectively and joint probability distribution P(x, y), the average instantaneous codeword length of X conditioned on Y = y will be given by
where A X is the set of all possible length functions l : X → Z + that satisfy Kraft's inequality for alphabet of size |X |. L(X|Y = y) is obtained by designing a Huffman code for the probability distribution P(x|y). With the same abuse of notation common for entropy, we let L(X|Y ) denote the expectation of L(X|Y = y) with respect to the randomness of Y . The average Huffman codeword length of X is given by L(X) and will be referred to as the Huffman length of X. For three random variables X, Y, Z jointly distributed according to P(x, y, z) We let L(X|y, Z ) stand for
namely, the average Huffman length of X conditioned on (Y = y, Z ) where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness of Z conditioned on the event that Y = y. Since more information at both the encoder and decoder (represented by the conditioning on Y ) cannot increase the optimal coding rate, we have that L(X|Y ) ≤ L(X), i.e., conditioning reduces the Huffman length of the source (this can also be easily shown directly from (1)). We consider the following zero-delay source coding problem: Alice wishes to losslessly transmit the output of a DMS X, distributed according to P(x), to Bob. The communication between Alice and Bob is intercepted by Eve. Alice and Bob operate without delay. When Alice observes X t she encodes it, possibly using previous source symbols, by an instantaneous code and transmits the codeword to Bob through a clean digital channel. Bob decodes the codeword and reproduces X t . A communication stage is defined to start when the source emits X t and ends when Bob reproduces X t , i.e., Bob cannot use future transmissions to calculate X t . We will assume that both Alice and Bob share access to a completely random binary sequence, U = (U 1 , U 2 , . . .), which is independent of the source and will be used as key bits. In addition, Alice has access, at each stage, to a private source of randomness {V t }, which is i.i.d and independent of the source and the key. Neither Bob nor Eve have access to {V t }. Let m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n , m i ∈ AE be a nondecreasing sequence of positive integers. At stage t, Alice uses m t − m t −1 bits that were not used so far from the key sequence. Let K t = (U m t−1 +1 , . . . , U m t ) denote the stage t key and l(K t ) = m t − m t −1 denote its length. The parsing of the key sequence up to stage t should be the same for Alice and Bob to maintain synchronization. This can be done through a predefined protocol where the key lengths are fixed in advance or "on the fly" through the transmitted data by a pre-defined protocol (such as detecting a valid codeword). Note that such a scheme can introduce dependencies between the used keys {K t } and the data at the encoder (X t , K t −1 , V t ). Therefore, while U is independent of all other variables, {K t } is not and might depend on the encoder's data through the number of bits from U it contains. Let Z be the set of all finite length binary strings. Denote Alice's output at stage t by Z t ∈ Z. When we write Z t = f (K t , A, B, C) for some encoding function f and any random variables (A, B, C), this will mean that the length of the key, K t , depends only on A, B, C and not other variables which are not arguments of f . We define the key rate to be R k = lim sup n→∞ 1 n n t =1 El(K t ). Let l t denote the total number of bits sent by the end of stage t (namely, all the bits representing Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z t ) and let B t = b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b l t denote the unparsed bit sequence containing all l t = l(B t ) bits, that were transmitted until the end of stage t. The rate of the encoder is defined by R = lim sup n→∞ 1 n El(B n ). Zero-delay secrecy model. When Eve has parsing information, she observes Alice's messages Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z t . Otherwise, she observes the unparsed bitstream, B t .
Parsing information is a sequence of integers, n 1 , n 2 , . . .
,. Namely, with parsing information the bitstream B t can be parsed back into the separate (encrypted) messages that were sent by Alice. Equivalently, parsing information can be thought as the sequence of starting times of the coding stages. In standard (non-encrypted) source coding, when UD codes are used, parsing information can be uniquely calculated from the bitstream itself. In our case, however, since the messages are encrypted, there is no reason to assume that B t can be uniquely parsed back into the separate messages Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . without either the use of the secret key (for the legitimate decoder) or with specific knowledge of the parsing information.
Given the keys up to stage t, K t , Bob can parse B n into Z 1 , . . . , Z t for any n ≥ t. The legitimate decoder is thus a sequence of functions X t = g t (K t , Z t ). The model of the system is depicted in Fig. 1 .
As discussed in the Introduction, we will treat two secrecy models. In the first model, we will assume that Eve can detect the starting point of each stage, i.e., it can parse B t into Z 1 , . . . , Z t . In the second model, we will assume that Eve taps into the bit-stream of a continuous transmission between Alice and Bob, B = B ∞ 1 but has no information on actual parsing of B into the actual messages, {Z t }. We treat each of the models in detail in the following subsections.
B. Eve Has Parsing Information
In this subsection, we assume that Eve can parse B n into Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z n . In order for the system to be fully secure, we follow Shannon [2] in defining what is a secure system.
Definition 1: When Eve has parsing information, a system is said to be perfectly secured if for any l, k, m, n P(x k l |z n m ) = P(x k l ).
(3) Namely, acquiring any portion of the transmission leaks no information on any portion of the source, which was not known to Eve in advance.
Parsing information is usually not part of any source coding model (with the exception of "one shot" models or one-toone codes [15] ). In this subsection, however, we assume that Eve has this knowledge. It is important to note that this is additional information (or side information) that is given to Eve and, unless it is known in advance (for example if fixed length codes are used) it generally cannot be deterministically calculated by observing the encrypted bit-stream which passes from Alice to Bob. The motivation, as discussed in the Introduction, is that sometimes such side information can be obtained by Eve through other means, for example a packet sniffer in a packet network. Moreover, it makes sense to assume that if Eve has such side information, Bob can acquire it as well (for example Eve gets this information through a packet sniffer, obviously, Bob will have this information as well). It is well known that when a decoder has parsing information, there is no need to use uniquely decodable (UD) codes and the average rate of the encoder can be lower than the entropy of the source [15] . However, it can be easily seen that whenever Eve has parsing information, the rate is lower bounded by log |X | .
Proposition 1: When Eve has parsing information, if the system is perfectly secured then
(4) Proof: Since the number of bits composing Z t must be independent of the source symbols (otherwise the length of Z t will leak information, as in the example in the Introduction) the parsing information will assist Bob/Eve to parse the bitstream into Z 1 , Z 2 , . . ., but will not assist in interpreting the code within Z t . Therefore, within each Z t an instantaneous code must be used (because of the zero delay constraint). By Kraft's inequality, the shortest block that can accommodate a UD code is of length log |X | since
where l(x) is the length of the codeword of x ∈ X and l max is the longest codeword in the code. The pessimistic conclusion from Proposition 1 is that there is no hope for compression in this setting. As we will see in the following, although such a rate is possible, it will be higher than that, when we will want to minimize the key rate.
The most general zero-delay encoder is a sequence of
In this section, we will treat a subclass of encoders that satisfy the Markov chain
Namely, given the past and current encoder outputs, the current source symbol, X t , does not reduce the uncertainty regarding the past keys. Similarly, knowing past keys will not assist a cryptanalyst in decrypting the current source symbol. This means that the past keys are either not reused, and if reused, the resulting message is encrypted by new key bits. We claim that this constraint, in the framework of perfect secrecy with a memoryless source is relatively benign. The class of encoders that satisfy (6), includes for example (but are not limited to) any secure encoder with the general structure of
In fact, any encoder that calculates a codeword, sayẐ t , possibly using the whole history of private randomness, source and keys, (i.e., with the most general encoder structure) and then outputs Z t =Ẑ t ⊕ K t will satisfy this constraint. Such a structure seems natural for one-time pad encryption.
As we will see in the following, although (6) allows for encoder/decoder that uses previously sent source symbols which at stage t are known only to Alice and Bob to reduce the number of key bits used at stage t, this will not be possible.
The main result of this subsection is the following theorem:
Theorem 1: In the class of codes that satisfy (6) , there exists a pair of perfectly secure zero-delay encoder and decoder if and only if R k ≥ L(X).
Remarks:
1) This theorem is in the spirit of the result of [2] , where the entropy is replaced by the Huffman length due to the zero-delay constraint. As discussed in the Introduction, variable-rate coding is not an option when we want the communication to be perfectly secret. This means that the encoder should either output constant length (short) blocks or have the transmission length independent of the source symbol in some other way. While by Proposition 1, no compression is possible, Theorem 1 shows that the rate of the key can be as low as L(X) which is the minimal length for zero delay coding. In the proof of the direct part of Theorem 1, we show that a constant rate encoder with block length corresponding to the longest Huffman codeword achieves this key rate. The padding is done by random bits from the encoder's private source of randomness.
2) When both Bob and Eve have SI, say
are drawn from a memoryless source emitting pairs, a theorem in the spirit of Theorem 1 can be derived by replacing the Huffman codes by zero-delay zeroerror SI aware codes, which were derived by Alon and Orlitsky in [16] . These codes also have the property that conditioning reduces their expected length and therefore the proof will contain the same arguments when (6) will be written as X t ↔ (Z t , Y t ) ↔ K t −1 (see also [14] for example of these proof techniques using the codes of [16] ). 3) Extending Theorem 1 from lossless to lossy source coding is possible by replacing X byX whereX will be the output of a zero-delay reproduction coder. If the distortion constraint is "per-letter", then this is straight forward. If the distortion constraint is on the whole block (as in classical rate-distortion) then (6) will impose a strong restriction on the reproduction coder, forcing it to be memoryless (otherwise, knowing past symbols by using K t −1 will leak information of the current symbol).
Although zero-delay rate distortion results suggest that indeedX should be memoryless (see [1] , [14] ), these results do not restrict the reproduction coder to be memoryless in advance.
We prove the converse and direct parts of Theorem 1 in following two subsections, respectively. Theorem 1 only lower bounds the key rate. Clearly there is a tradeoff between the key rate and the coding rate. We propose an achievable region in Section II-B3.
1) Converse Part: For every lossless secure encoderdecoder pair that satisfies (6), we lower bound the key rate as follows:
= nL(X).
The first equality is true since the key bits are incompressible and therefore the Huffman length is the same as the number of key bits. (7) is true since conditioning reduces the Huffman length (the simple proof of this is omitted). (8) follows since X t is a function of (K t , Z t ) (the decoder's function) and therefore, given (K t −1 , Z t ), the code for K t also reveals X t . (9) is true since with the same conditioning on (K t −1 , Z t ), the instantaneous code of (K t , X t ) cannot be shorter then the instantaneous code of X t . (10) is due to (6) and finally, (11) is true since we consider a secure encoder. We therefore showed that R k ≥ L(X).
2) Direct Part: We construct an encoder-decoder pair that are fully secure with R k = L(X). Let l H −max denote the longest Huffman codeword of X. We know that l H −max ≤ |X| − 1. The encoder output will always be l H −max bits long and will be built from two fields. The first field will be the Huffman codeword for the observed source symbol X t . Denote its length by l H (X t ). This codeword is then XORed with l H (X t ) key bits. The second field will be composed of l H −max −l H (X t ) random bits (taken from the private source of randomness) that will pad the encrypted Huffman codeword to be of length l H −max . Regardless of the specific source output, Eve sees constant length codewords composed of random uniform bits. Therefore no information about the source is leaked by the encoder outputs. When Bob receives such a block, it starts XORing it with key bits until it detects a valid Huffman codeword. The rest of the bits are ignored. Obviously, the key rate which is needed is L(X).
3) Achievable Region: The direct proof shown above, suggests a single point on the R − R k plane. Namely, the point where R k = L(X) (its minimal possible value), but the encoder rate is high and is equal to l H −max . However, there are many other achievable points which can be shown using the same idea as in the direct part of the proof by replacing the Huffman code by another instantaneous code. For every possible instantaneous code for the source X (not necessarily optimal code for this source) we can repeat the arguments of the direct part of the proof by setting the rate (block length) to be the longest codeword in this code and the XORing only the bits which originate from this code while padding the remainder of the block with random bits. Any such code, which is a sub-optimal code for source coding, will give us an operating point in the R − R k plane. The extreme case is obtained by using the trivial source code which uses log |X | bits for all symbols and XORing all the bits with key bits. Since there is only a finite number of possible instantaneous codes (when not counting codes that artificially enlarge the description of shorter codes by adding bits) we will get a finite number of points in the R − R k plane. The lower convex envelope of these points is achievable by time-sharing. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The curve we get is obviously an upper bound for the optimal R − R k curve for this setting. We see an interesting phenomenon where the role of source-coding is inverted: optimal codes for source coding (e.g, Huffman code) traditionally designed to minimize the encoding rate achieves the highest encoding rates in this setting while sub-optimal codes will achieve low encoding rates (with the trivial source code achieving the lower bound of Proposition 1). The traditional role of these codes is achieved, however, for the key rate.
C. Eve Has No Parsing Information
In this subsection, we relax our secrecy requirements and assume that Eve observes the whole transmission from Alice to Bob, but has no information on how to parse the bitstream B n into Z 1 , . . . , Z n . Note that we did not restrict the eavesdropper in any way since parsing information is generally not available and cannot be calculated from B n . Moreover, this setting has a practical motivation, as discussed in the Introduction.
Note that although Eve has no parsing information, she still knows the length of the whole bit-stream, which can still leak information on the source. For example, suppose Alice uses a prefix code that has a 1 bit codeword length for, say, X = a and sends n symbols to Bob. Even if the bit-stream is encrypted with a one time pad (and therefore not parsable by Eve by our assumptions) but Eve sees that the total length of the bit-stream is exactly n bits, she knows with certainty that all the symbols in the bit-stream are a. While such a system is not secure by Definition 1, the probability of the described event vanishes exponentially fast with the length of the source sequence. In this section, we have a relaxed definition of secrecy which allows for encoders that leak information on the source, but with vanishing probability:
Definition 2: When Eve has no parsing information, we say that the system is asymptotically secure if the following holds for every t ≤ n and every x ∈ X :
(13) This means that when the bit-stream is long enough, the eavesdropper does not learn from it anything about the source symbols with probability 1. Note that the encoder from Section II-B2 trivially satisfies this constraint since it was a constant block length encoder and the bits within the block where encrypted by a one-time pad. We will see that with the relaxed secrecy requirement we can reduce the rate of the encoder to be the same as the rate of the key. As in the previous subsection, where we dealt with encoders satisfying (6), here, we will limit the discussion as well. We will treat only encoders that satisfy
where P − Q 1 denotes the variational distance between the probability measures, P − Q 1 = x |P(x) − Q(x)|. This constraint means that when n is large, for all t for which a gap remains to the end of the bit-stream, we practically have the Markov chain as in (6) with Z n replaced by B n . Note that this requirement is less stringent than (6) and in fact any encoder which satisfies (6) and is secure with parsing information (i.e., satisfies definition 1) will satisfy (14) . Since B t can be parsed with K t , the margin between t and n in (14) ensures that for any t considered, there is a portion of B n that cannot be parsed, even if the eavesdropper acquired the previous keys. The discussion that followed the constraint (6) is valid here as well, namely, we only consider encoders that do not reuse old key bits to encrypt new messages.
We have the following theorem: Theorem 2: In the class of codes that satisfy (14) , there exists a pair of asymptotically secure, zero-delay, encoder and decoder if and only if R ≥ L(X), R k ≥ L(X).
The fact that R ≥ L(X) is trivial since we deal with a zero-delay lossless encoder. However, unlike the case of Theorem 1, here it can be achieved along with R k ≥ L(X). Note that if instead of defining the secrecy constraint as in (13), we required that for every n, t, P(X t |B n ) = P(X t ) then a counterpart of Theorem 1 will hold here. However, the encoder will, as in the proof of the direct part of Theorem 1, operate at constant rate. We prove the converse and direct parts of Theorem 2 in the following two subsections, respectively. 1) Converse Part: Following the arguments of Section II-B.1, we have:
Now, let us define
It can be immediately seen that for b n ∈ B n ,
where l max is the longest codeword for X, whose length can be bounded by |X |. Using the definition given in (2), we continue as follows:
We now define C n = {b n : P(x t |b n ) − P(x t ) 1 ≤ } and continue as follows
Now since by (13) and (14) we have that P(B n ∩ C n ) → 1 for any > 0 we showed that
2) Direct Part: The direct part of the proof is achieved by separation. We show that the simplest memoryless encoder that encodes X t using a Huffman code and then XORs the resulting bits with a one time pad is optimal here. Therefore, both the coding rate and the key rate of this scheme are equal to L(X).
Note that with such a simple encoder, no prior knowledge of n is needed and therefore such an encoder is suitable for realtime streaming applications. We need to show that (13) holds.
We outline the idea before giving the formal proof. The bits of B n are independent of X t since we encrypted them with a one-time pad. Therefore, only the total length of the bit-stream can leak information. Let l(B n ) represent the number of bits in B n . By the strong law of large numbers, 1 n l(B n ) → L(X) a.s. But if l(B n ) ≈ nL(X) then the only thing that Eve learns is that X n is typical (or equivalently that the law of large number is working) and this, of course, is known in advance. There are events where Eve can indeed learn a lot from the length of B n , but the probability of these events vanish as n becomes large.
We invoke martingale theory [17] for a formal proof. Note that B n can be written as B n = (l(B n ), V n ), where V n is uniform over 1, 2, . . . , 2 l(B n ) and is the number which is represented by the bits of B n (in base 2). Given l(B n ), V n is independent of X n since all bits are encrypted. Therefore, we have the following chain X t ↔ l(B n ) ↔ B n . Now, since l(B n ) is a function of B n , we have that P(X t |B n ) = P(X t |B n , l(B n )) = P(X t |l(B n )).
Finally, define the filtration
Since the Y i -s are independent and since the events in
) are invariant to a finite permutation of the indexes of the Y i − s, we have by the Hewitt-Savage zero-one law [17, Th. 4 
For n ≥ t, let M n = E I t (x)|F −n . Note that M n is a bounded (reverse) martingale which converges almost surely to M ∞ as n → ∞. Since the source is memoryless and since n ≥ t, we have that I t (x) is independent of Y n+1 , Y n+1,... and therefore given l(B n ), X t is independent of l(B n+1 ), l(B n+2 ), . . .. Thus we have that M n = E I t (x)|l(B n ), l(B n+1 ), . . . = P(X t = x|l(B n )). Also note that M n does not depend on t, since due to symmetry, P(X t = x|l(B n )) = P(X 1 = x|l(B n ) ). This allows us to consider not only finite t, but also t ≤ n that grow with n to infinity.
Finally, the fact that F −∞ is trivial implies that M ∞ is a constant, which is the expectation of the indicator, i.e., P(X t = x). We therefore showed that P(X t = x|l(B n )) → P(X t = x) a.s.
To see that this encoder satisfies (14) note that
where B t,n denotes the bit-stream starting from time t until time n. The last equation is true since we have that X t ↔ l(B n ) − l(B t −1 ) ↔ B t,n Now, for t ≤ (1 − )n, the analysis we did above for P(X t = x t |B n ) is valid here (with a time shift of t) since l(B n ) − l(B t −1 ) grows as n grows and therefore (14) is satisfied.
III. CAUSAL RATE-DISTORTION WITH SECRECY CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we extend [1] , [13] , [14] to include secrecy constraints. Unlike the discussion of Section II, here we will allow lossy reconstruction and imperfect secrecy. As in any source coding work, we will be interested in the encoder rate R and the minimal distortion, D which is attained with this rate. With the addition of secrecy constraints, two more figures of merit will be added. The first is the uncertainty h, (measured by equivocation, to be defined shortly) at the eavesdropper regarding the source. The second is the rate of a private key, R k , shared by Alice and Bob with which a given uncertainty h, is achievable. Note that when D > 0, Bob is also left with uncertainty regarding the original source sequence since he only knows it is contained in a D-ball around its reconstruction. Therefore, even with no attempt of encryption, Eve will "suffer" this same uncertainty. This implies that (R, R k , h, D) are tied together and the goal of this section is to find the region of attainable quadruples.
Our system model is depicted in Fig. 3 . We will deal with two settings, which differ by the position of the switches denoted by S in Fig. 3 . Namely, the availability of SI at Bob and Eve. While the setting without SI is a special case of the setting which includes SI, these settings are different from a causal rate-distortion standpoint. Without SI, it was shown in [1] that the chain of encoder and decoder is equivalent to chain of a causal reproduction coder (to be formally defined shortly) followed by lossless compression. However, when SI is available to the decoder, this equivalence does not hold since the encoder cannot reproduceX without the SI. The next two subsections deal with the two settings, starting from the simpler case without SI. Formal definition of the settings will be given in the beginning of each subsection.
A. Causal Secrecy Without SI 1) Preliminaries: The notation conventions we introduced in the beginning of Section II-A for random variables, vectors etc., will be used here as well. Let X n be a sequence produced by a memoryless source. The alphabet of X, X , as well as all other alphabets in the sequel, is finite. The source sequence is given to Alice. In addition to the source, Alice has access to a secret key, K , uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , M k }, which is independent of X n . Bob shares the same key. Alice uses the source and the key to create a binary representation Z = {Z k } k≥1 (we omit the dependence of Z on n to simplify notation). Bob receives Z and with its shared key creates a reproductionX n , whereX ∈X is the reproduction alphabet. As in [1] , the cascade of encoder and decoder will be referred as a reproduction coder, i.e., the reproduction coder is a family of functions { f k } k≥1 such thatX k = f k (X n , K ).
We say that a reproduction function is causal relative to the source if for all t:
We are given a distortion measure d, d : X ×X → Ê + where Ê + denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. Let x d(x,x) . When a source code with a given induced reproduction coder { f k } is applied to the source X n , the average distortion is defined by
Let l(Z) denote the number of bits in the bitstream Z. The average rate of the encoder is defined by
In our model, an eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts the bitstream Z. We follow the common assumptions that Eve is familiar with the encoding and decoding functions, coding techniques, etc., which are employed by Alice and Bob, but is unaware of the actual realizations of the source and the key. The uncertainty regarding the source sequence X at the eavesdropper after intercepting Z is measured by the per-letter equivocation, which we denote by h. Namely, h = lim inf n→∞ 1 n H (X n |Z). Unlike [1] and [13] , where the bit representation which is passed from the encoder to the decoder, Z, was only an intermediate step between a lossless encoder and a lossless decoder, here, Z is important as it should leave Eve as oblivious as possible of the source sequence. However, as in [1] and [13] , applying a lossless code on Z between the encoder and decoder can only improve the coding rate and will not affect the other figures of merit.
Let R N O−S I denote the set of positive quadruples (R, R k , D, h) such that for every > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists an encoder and a decoder, inducing a causal reproduction coder and satisfying:
Our goal, in this section, is to find the region of quadruples, which are achievable with a causal reproduction coder. To this end, we will need previous results on causal rate-distortion results [1] , which we briefly describe below.
In [1] , the same model as described above was considered without the secrecy constraints. The goal of [1] was to find the tradeoff between R and D under the constraint that the reproduction coder is causal. Towards this goal, the equivalence of the two models in Fig. 4 was proved. Namely, the rate of a source code with a given reproduction coder can be only improved if a lossless source code will be applied to its output. This implied that it is enough to consider only systems that first generate the reproduction process and then losslessly encode it as in Fig. 4b . Indeed, this separation is the basis for many practical coding systems.
Let R c (D) denote the minimal achievable rate over all
and finally, let r c (D) denote the lower convex envelope of r c (D). The following theorem is the main result of [1] :
(31) It was shown in [1] that r c (D) is achieved by time-sharing no more than two scalar reproduction coders.
2) Characterizing R N O−S I : Although a scheme that first uses the optimal encoder of [1] to create the same bit-stream and then XOR the resulting bits with key bits is obviously possible, it is not immediately clear that such a separation is optimal. The reason for this is that one needs to first rule out the possibility that using key bits during the quantization and using entropy coding with the key as SI at both sides might improve performance. The following theorem, which is the main result of this subsection, shows that the separation scheme is indeed optimal. 
(32) It is evident from Theorem 4 that the direct part is achieved by the separation scheme proposed above. Theorem 4 is a special case of the more general theorem, which includes SI, we prove in the next subsection (Theorem 6) and therefore no proof is given here. 4
B. Causal Secrecy With Side Information
In this section, we extend the setting of Section III-A to include SI at Bob and Eve. As in the previous section, we start by describing the model and mentioning related causal rate-distortion results before giving our results.
In this section, we assume a memoryless source which emits sequences of random variables (X n , Y n , W n ). As before, X n is observed by Alice. Bob and Eve observe Y n , W n respectively. The sequences (X n , Y n , W n ) are distributed according to a joint distribution
Namely, we assume a degraded SI structure where Bob's SI is better than Eve's SI. Although we do not deal with other possible SI structures, we will discuss such extensions in the sequel. As in the model without SI, Alice and Bob have access to a shared secret key denoted by K , K ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . . , M k } which is independent of the source. Alice sends a binary representation Z = {Z k } k≥1 which is used by the decoder along with the SI and key to createX n . We call the cascade of encoder and decoder a reproduction coder, namely a family of functions { f k } k≥1 such that X k = f k (K , X n , Y n ). A reproduction coder is said to be causal with respect to the source and SI if for all t:
The distortion constraint (24) and the definition of rate (25) remain the same as in the setting without SI. When SI is available to the decoder, the cascade of encoder and decoder cannot be a recast into a cascade of reproduction coder followed by lossless coding as in Fig. 4 since the encoder has no access to the SI the decoder uses to improve its reproduction and therefore cannot calculateX t . A causal reproduction coder in our setting is composed of a family of causal encoding functions which calculate messages, S t , which are causal functions of the source symbols, namely S t = e t (K , X t ) and causal decoding functions which use the encoder messages along with the SI and key to create the reproduction, namely, X t = g t (K , S t , Y t ). Note that this representation stems directly from the causality restriction and every system that induces a causal reproduction coder can be written in this way. 5 As in [1] , although forcing causal encoding and decoding functions, this model allows for arbitrary delays which can be introduced when transmitting the encoder's output, S n , to the decoder. Namely, Z is not necessarily causal in S n . We will allow events where the decoder fails to decode the bit-stream Z to produce the encoder messages, S n . In such an event, we have no restriction on the dependence of the output on the SI (and therefore on the source). However, we restrict that such error events will happen with small probability.
Namely, we require that for every > 0, P(S n = g(K , Y n , Z)) < for large enough n and some function g.
The secrecy of the system is measured by the uncertainty of Eve with regard to the source sequence, measured by the normalized equivocation 1 n H (X n |W n , Z). Let R S I denote the set of positive quadruples (R, R k , D, h) such that for every > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists an encoder and a decoder inducing a causal reproduction coder satisfying:
Our goal is to characterize this region.
In the context of causal source coding, such a model was considered in [13] and [14] . In [13] the model was restricted to common reconstruction between the encoder and decoder, meaning that both parties agree on the reconstruction. This restriction prevents the decoder from using the SI when reconstructing the source and the SI can be used only for lossless transmission of the reconstruction which is calculated at the encoder. In this case, a cascade of a reproduction coder followed by lossless entropy coding which uses SI is valid. The full treatment of SI for this scenario was recently given in [14] .
Let 
where the minimum is over all functions f :
The alphabet S is a finite alphabet whose size is part of the optimization process (|S| ≤ |X |). Finally, let r S I c (D) be the lower convex envelope of r S I c (D). The following theorem is proved in [14] : Theorem 5 ([14, Th. 4] ):
It was shown that r S I c (D) is achieved by time-sharing at most two sets of scalar encoders ( f ) and decoders (g). Moreover, SI lookahead was shown to be useless in the causal setting.
C. Characterizing R S I
We have the following theorem. Remark: The above theorem pertains to degraded SI structure. It was shown in [5] that for lossless secure compression with SI, Slepian-Wolf coding is optimal when the SI is degraded, but not optimal otherwise. For a general SI structure, a simple scheme will apply memoryless quantization (resulting in a new memoryless source) and then apply the scheme of [5] . The output of the scheme of [5] can be further encrypted with key bits as needed to achieve the desired h. Such a scheme will not violate the causal restriction. Although schemes that first apply memoryless quantization and then losslessly compress the output are optimal in the context of all known causal source coding works, it is not clear that this is the case here. The challenge in the converse part is that when applying a causal encoder (but not memoryless), the resulting process is not necessarily memoryless. We were unsuccessful in proving the converse for a general SI structure.
We prove the converse and direct parts of Theorem 6 in the following two subsections, respectively. 1) Converse Part: We now proceed to prove the converse part, starting with lower bounding the encoding rate. We assume a given encoder and decoder pair which form a causal reproduction coder with (R, R k , D, h) ∈ R S I . By the definition of our model we have by Fano's inequality ( [18] ) that H (S n |K , Y n , Z) ≤ n .
For n large enough and every encoder and decoder pair that induce a causal reproduction coder and satisfy (34)-(37) the following chain of inequalities hold:
where (41) follows from Fano's inequality and in (42) we used the fact that S t −1 is a function of (K , X t −1 ). In (43), μ(·) denotes the joint probability mass function of its arguments. In the last line, we used the independence of X t from the key and SI at time other then t. Now, e t (X t , k, x t −1 )
can be seen as a specific function, f , in the definition where in (59) we used the fact that by construction we have the following chain W n → X n → B → Z. In (60), we used (58) and (60). Note that when the decoding of the Slepian-Wolf code fails, the resulting (arbitrary) reconstruction sequence depends non-causally on the SI, thus breaking the causal reproduction coder structure. However, the probability of such event can be made negligible when n becomes large.
IV. CONCLUSION
We investigated the intersection between causal and zero-delay source coding and information theoretic secrecy. It was shown that simple separation is optimal in the causal setting when we considered encoder and decoder pairs that are causal only with respect to the source. An interesting extension will be to investigate the setting where the use of the key is also restricted to be causal, for example when the key is streamed along with the source and should not be be stored. This will force the quantizer to encrypt the resulting sequence before the lossless code (see [19] for example). In the zero-delay setting we considered only perfect secrecy. An interesting and algorithmically challenging research direction is to investigate imperfect secrecy in the zero-delay setting. Moreover, it was mentioned that the extension of our zero-delay results to the case when the same SI is available to Bob and Eve is straightforward. This will continue to hold when even if Bob and Eve have different versions of SI but P(w, y) > 0 for all w, y, where W is Eve's SI and Y is Bob's SI. However, when imperfect secrecy is considered, it is not clear how different SI affects the equivocation at Eve. Such a setting is another direction for future research.
APPENDIX

Proof of Markov Chain
We show that any secure encoder that satisfies Z t = f (K t , V t , X t , Z t −1 ) satisfies the Markov chain. To see why this is true observe that P(k t −1 , x t , z t ) = P(z t )P(x t |z t )P(k t −1 |x t , z t )
Focusing on P(k t −1 |x t , z t ) we have
= P(k t −1 , z t −1 )P(x t )P(z t |x t , z t −1 ) P(x t , z t )
= P(k t −1 , z t −1 )P(x t )P(z t |z t −1 ) P(x t )P(z t |x t )
= P(k t −1 , z t −1 )P(z t |z t −1 ) P(z t −1 )P(z t |z t −1 ) = P(k t −1 |z t −1 )
where in (62) we note that x t −1 can be computed from z t −1 , k t −1 . In (63) we used the independence of (k t , v t ) from k t −1 and the fact that z t is a function of (k t , v t , x t ). The independence of x t from (k t −1 , z t −1 ) was also used. In (64) we used the secure encoder assumption (independence of X t from Z t ). Therefore we have, P(k t −1 , x t , z t ) = P(x t , z t )P(k t −1 |x t , z t ) = P(x t , z t )P(k t −1 |z t ) (66) and we proved that (6) is satisfied.
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